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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 03-3192
__________
JOSEPH M. MIKRUK
                     Appellant
v.
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE;
JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 00-2232)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 27, 2004
___________
Before: NYGAARD, AMBRO, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: November 10, 2004)
__________
OPINION
                      
Garth, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Joseph Mikruk appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee John Potter, Postmaster General (the “Postmaster
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General”) of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), on Mikruk’s disability
discrimination claim.  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. We will affirm.  
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we recount only those facts
that are relevant to the issues before us.  Mikruk is a type 1 “brittle” diabetic.  His
condition is controlled primarily through insulin, diet and a strictly regimented schedule. 
Mikruk’s supervisors were aware of his condition.  From 1983 to 1993, he was employed
with the USPS as a letter carrier.  In 1993, Mikruk bid on and was awarded a maintenance
position.  His working hours were 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and he was off on Wednesday
and Saturday.
In December 1998, Mikruk was assigned new scheduled hours of 10:00 a.m. to
7:00 p.m. with days off on Wednesday and Thursday.  Mikruk refused to work the new
schedule and did not return to work after December 1998.  The USPS terminated Mikruk
in October 2000.
Mikruk filed suit alleging disability discrimination under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.  In his amended complaint, Mikruk claimed that the
Postmaster General failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disability, i.e., his
diabetes, when he changed Mikruk’s work schedule.  Mikruk further stated that his
schedule was changed in retaliation for a letter he wrote to the main post office in
-3-
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, detailing an alleged affair between Mikruk’s supervisor and the
union president.  Mikruk also alleged that the Postmaster General treated Mikruk more
harshly than similarly situated people without diabetes.
On December 31, 2002, the Postmaster General moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that (1) Mikruk failed to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination because there was no evidence that he was disabled within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act or that his employer took adverse action because of a disability, (2)
there was no evidence of similarly situated employees outside of Mikruk’s alleged
protected class who were treated more favorably than he was, and (3) the Postmaster
General had made appropriate accommodations for Mikruk’s condition.
In an opinion dated May 30, 2003, the District Court granted the motion for
summary judgment, finding that Mikruk failed to make out a prima facie claim of
discrimination.  Specifically, Mikruk argued that he was disabled because he was
substantially impaired in the major life activity of work.  The District Court concluded,
however, that Mikruk was not substantially impaired because he had not produced
evidence to support the conclusion that he was unable to work in a broad class of jobs. 
Because it found that Mikruk did not make out a prima facie claim, the District Court did
not reach the Postmaster General’s alternative arguments for summary judgment.
II.
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
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and apply the same standard as the District Court, i.e., whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted).  “One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses . . . .”  Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).  Applying that standard here, we conclude that the
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster General. 
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act, Mikruk must show that (1) he has a disability, (2) he is otherwise qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation,
and (3) that he was terminated or prevented from performing the job.  Mengine v. Runyon,
114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1997).  An individual with a disability is a person who:
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such person;
(B) has a record of such impairment; or
(C) is regarded as having such impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B).  As noted above, the District Court found that Mikruk failed to
establish a prima facie claim of discrimination because he failed to demonstrate that he
was substantially impaired in the major life activity of work.  On that basis it granted the
Postmaster General’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Mikruk does not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that he was not
substantially impaired in the major life activity of work.  Instead, he argues that the
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District Court erred by not first considering whether he was substantially impaired in
other major life activities, specifically eating.  A review of the record demonstrates that
Mikruk failed to raise that issue before the District Court.  Instead, as the District Court
found, Mikruk asserted only that his impairment “limits a major life activity, work.”
It is well established that the failure to properly raise an argument before the
district court constitutes a waiver of the right to raise that argument on appeal, absent
compelling or exceptional circumstances.  See Gucci America, Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354
F.3d 228, 233 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  On appeal, Mikruk does not contend
that compelling circumstances are present.  Instead, he asks the Court to read his
argument – that he is substantially limited in the major life activity of eating – as
“inextricably related to his work.”  
We decline to address this issue for the first time on appeal.  Notably, Mikruk had
several opportunities to develop this argument before the District Court but failed to do
so.  Because Mikruk did not establish that he was substantially impaired in a life activity,
the District Court correctly concluded that he failed to make out a viable discrimination
claim.  Therefore, its grant of summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster General was
proper.
As a final matter, we note that because Mikruk waived the issue, we need not
decide whether eating is a major life activity within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act.  While language in our recent opinion in Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., — F.3d —,
1 Fiscus involved a plaintiff with end stage renal disease who was required to undergo
kidney dialysis several times a day.  We held there that kidney failure was a covered disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act because the inability to cleanse and eliminate body
waste substantially impairs a major life activity.  Furthermore, whether eating is or is not a major
life activity within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act cannot be decided here as that issue was
never raised in the District Court, as we noted supra in text.
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2004 WL 2219323 (3d Cir. 2004), may be read as indicating, but not holding, that eating
does constitute a major life activity, that case is distinguishable.1  Moreover, the present
record does not support Mikruk’s argument raised for the first time on appeal.
III.
Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
